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Andrzej Lasota
Mathematics and Philosophy∗
m
y statement is supposed to be an encouragement, an introduction
to a discussion about connections between philosophy and math-
ematics. Such an introduction should contain statements provoking a re-
sponse. In this case it is not too difficult. I just look at mathematics slightly
differently than most of my colleagues. That is the case perhaps because
I came to mathematics “from outside.” I was interested in biology and
economics, I studied physics and only later did I become a mathematician.
I am of course aware of the fact that the relationship between philoso-
phy, mathematics and reality is difficult and that I may be wrong in many,
or maybe even in all my points. I would gladly correct my views upon hear-
ing appropriate arguments. However, what I will say here is what I deeply
believe in, not just a way for me to sate my natural need to formulate
everything as strictly as possible.
I divided my statement into six theses. Of course the division is quite
arbitrary and some of the points are closely related.
Thesis 1. For simplicity I will use the words of Hugo Steinhaus, one of the
greatest mathematicians of our century, who in one of his books said that
The subject of mathematics is reality,
Mathematics is universal.
Of course, it is a wonderful summary, but just a summary. Speaking more
precisely I believe that mathematics is just the structure of our world.
Not a description of that structure, but the structure itself. Undoubtedly,
a mathematician can create very strange objects and it may seem he is
straying far away from reality. It only appears that way. If his mathematics
is good, it will sooner or later turn out it is a fragment of reality. If it is
bad, it will only be an amalgamation of bits of the real world, like a dream
is an amalgamation of our everyday experiences. A dream may be strange,
but have you noticed how you cannot speak a language you do not know?
∗This text was originally published in Polish in the book: Michał Heller, Jacek Urban-
iec (Eds.), Otwarta nauka i jej zwolennicy. OBI Kraków and BIBLOS, Tarnów 1996. We
would like to kindly thank the Publishers for agreeing to reprint this article in our book.
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I have been asked whether mathematics would be different if the
world was different. Of course, it would. Moreover, I think if there was
no world, there would have been no mathematics either – in no sense
of the world. One can conceive worlds without mathematics, but not ours.
The worlds seen by mystics, felt by dreamers and poets may be nonmath-
ematical. Our hard, real world is a world of mathematics. Mathematics
in its broadest sense teaches us that certain things are impossible. If two
sides of a triangle have lengths a = 3 cm and b = 4 cm, it is impossi-
ble for the third length c to be shorter than 1 cm or longer than 7 cm.
If the two sides of lengths a and b are perpendicular, all the possibilities
except c = 5 cm are excluded (Pythagoras theorem). That is why we do
not observe miracles. They are just impossible.
Thesis 2. We are currently observing very fast, intensive develop-
ment of mathematics. It is displayed in the exponential growth of
the number of mathematical papers, bulletins and researchers.
It is particularly spectacular how we have had more mathematicians in
the twentieth century than in all the previous ones. It is known that after
World War II we have proven millions (sic!) of new theorems.
This is an appearance, a camouflage. No-one can apply millions of
theorems. These are naked king’s robes. At the beginning of this century
we axiomatized probability theory, created topology, functional analysis,
several disciplines forming the foundations of modern mathematics. Noth-
ing really new has been discovered since. We are playing with the same
ingredients: set, relation, function, properties of functions. The speed of
mathematical expansion of mathematical methods, which engulfed physics
and chemistry in recent centuries and have been serving astronomy from
the beginning, has been halted. Attempts to apply mathematics to study
social phenomena are a compromitation and those to describe biological
systems an undertaking beyond mathematicians’ capabilities.
A similar phenomenon can be observed in entire science, technology
and the whole of civilization, perhaps with the exception of biology. Let
us notice that we have created some new ways of transport between the
nineteenth and twentieth century, that is, a bicycle, a motorbike, a car, an
airplane, a helicopter at the end of the 30s. We have been perfecting their
construction, developing production, we are englufing earth in a network
of motorways, making runways longer, but for over half a century nothing
new has been created. Absolutely nothing.
Let us then come back to mathematics. Why is it spreading around in-
stead of rising up? There are two reasons in my opinion, namely, a psycho-
logical and a sociological one. First of all, modern mathematics is beautiful,
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strict and flexible already, we can express many things in it. It is good.
Good is the biggest enemy of better. We are not looking for anything
new inventions, because it is easier and more enjoyable to develop old and
beautiful theories which still bear fruit. Similarly, it is easier to perfect
cars and build highways rather than think of, construct and apply a new
way of transport.
Secondly, in the past a researcher was a bit of a madman, a bit of a freak
and a bit of a hermit. Today, a researcher is a stable and calm profession.
More stable and calm than the profession of an advocate, businessman or
even a farmer. Hundreds of thousands of people are researchers. Powerful
institutions have been created that make sure that a researcher’s profession
is only undertaken by people of appropriate qualifications. Methods of
awarding scientific advancement and securing grants have been codified.
Forms which need to be filled by every researcher are getting longer and
more complicated and an ability to fill them is one of the fundamental
skills to develop one’s career and secure grants.
In this way, the strange ones and some of the cheating ones have
been cut away, completely thrown out. But by throwing out thousands of
non-conforming eccentrics, we have thrown out many geniuses with them.
Therefore, the realization of groundbreaking ideas is now impossible.
This is not a joke or a paradox. One of my best friends, an Ameri-
can mathematician, applied for two grants. In the first one, about his side
interests, he proposed a research project within a well-known and inten-
sively developing approximation method. He supported that application
with a literature review and obtained a grant without a problem. In his
second application, connected to his life’s passion – stochastic processes
theory, he proposed to study a brand new, interesting property of Markov
processes. He did not get the grant. What is even worse, the feedback fol-
lowing this rejection can be summarized in the following way: “You asked
to study something new, that has not been studied by anyone before you.
It would be better if you studied things already being researched by well
known mathematicians” (and some names were given here). That friend
gave me that letter to read and I thought that taxpayers’ money was spent
to build an institution which will successfully stop every groundbreaking
result in science.
The scientific bureaucracy, while taking part of the money given by
the society for the development of science, is interested only in one thing –
creating nonsensical rules and decisions, which successfully contribute to
wasting the rest of the funds, not secured by the officials.
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Thesis 3. Progress can be slowed down, but not halted – espe-
cially not scientific progress. There will be people who will change
modern science, especially mathematics. In several decades, we will be
dealing with new notions and efficient methods which we cannot even
dream of now. It is not that the quantity will translate into quality. Quite
the opposite, new quality will arise despite the quantity.
That sort of mathematics is sought for while dreaming of universal
methods of catastrophe theory, fuzzy sets, fractal geometry or chaos the-
ory. So far we only have “ground trials,” but there is hope for liftoff. They
are also hugely controversial. Let us just recall the confusion surround-
ing catastrophe theory. Some saw in it a universal way of describing the
dynamics of the world, which allows one to understand almost anything
– from the formation of spirals on a slug’s shell to the workings of the
heart and prison strikes. Others just considered it to be an unremarkable
fragment of singularity theory on manifolds.
Similar controversies, although on a smaller scale, surround the fuzzy
set theory. Its opponents consider it to be complete nonsense or a badly
founded fragment of probability theory. There are also those who would
like to make the study of it illegal via appropriate law bills or decisions of
scientific officials (!). Its supporters think that systematic usage of fuzzy
set theory will give a technological advantage over the rest of the world to
Japanese engineers.
In both cases the truth lies somewhere in the middle, but it seems like
the sceptics are closer to it this time. I have great hopes in fractal theory,
an optimist that I am. Thanks to this it was noticed that the hardest,
most complicated processes seem to be describable as dynamical systems
on spaces of measures. Both relatively simple chemical substances and
complex biological systems seem to be fractals.
Thesis 4. Mathematical discoveries have an important philosoph-
ical meaning. This does not only concern discoveries in foundations of
mathematics. Modern mathematical analysis, dynamical system theory
and probability theory touch upon such fundamental issues as the deter-
minism problem, the possibility of exact prediction of events, the existence
of hidden parameters, etc.
Thanks to the work of Edward N. Lorenz and the general dynamics
of stochastic processes the illusion of the predicted, deterministic world
has been shattered. In short, Lorenz’s reasoning goes as follows. Imagine
a system described just by one parameter. Let us call it x. What is more, we
assume that the values of x are bounded, being, say, in the interval [0, 1].
Moreover, let us assume that x changes in every time unit in a completely
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deterministic way. In mathematical language, this means that our model
is described by a recurrence equation:
xn+1 = T (xn), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . (1)
where xn denotes the value of parameter x at time n and T is the given
transformation of interval [0, 1] into itself. Thus, we conceived a reasonably
simple space: the [0, 1] interval. Let us also take a relatively simple func-
tion T . If we discard linear transformations, which in the one dimensional
case yield completely uninteresting dynamics, the simplest map is a second
degree polynomial. One such polynomial is, for example, T (x) = λx(1−x),
where λ is a fixed parameter. For 0 ≤ λ ≤ 4 this maps the [0, 1] interval
into itself. Thus, we will study the following recurrence equation:
xn+1 = λxn(1− xn), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . (2)
for values xn ∈ [0, 1] with a parameter λ ∈ [0, 4]. It turns out that al-
ready such as simple system has multiple unexpected properties. It can
imitate almost all types of phenomena occuring in nature. One can obtain
sequences (xn) which increase or oscillate and converge to one point. One
can obtain periodical behavior with any desired period, for example 17 in
the case of a 17-year cicada. Furthermore, bounded, aperiodic and irreg-
ular trajectories are also possible. We call them chaotic trajectories. It is
simplest to obtain them by taking λ = 4. Then for almost all x0 ∈ [0, 1]
(in the Lebesgue measure sense) the trajectories will be chaotic. They have
a certain particular property. If we input the starting value x0 with, let
us say, 20 decimal places accuracy and we start calculating xn from the
formula (2) with λ = 4, then x90 may contain an error already on its first
decimal place. With each step the initial error will approximately double.
We will run into the same issue if we input x0 exactly, but calculate xn on
two different computers with different rounding algorithms. The result of
calculating x90 may be meaningfully different. This exceptional sensitivity
to change of initial conditions and, in particular, to rounding errors during
calculations is characteristic to chaotic processes. It makes it impossible
to predict them on a longer time period.
The situation would be completely different if we repeated those numer-
ical experiments for λ = 2. In each case we would have obtained x90 = 0.5
with high accuracy. That is because for λ = 2 the dynamical system given
by (2) is asymptotically stable.
We have noticed, following Lorenz, that chaotic and stable processes
appear in a very simple, one dimensional system. Those types of processes
also feature in multidimensional processes describing complicated models
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from nature. Movements of large masses of water and air unfortunately
belong to the class of chaotic processes. This is why forecasting weather,
say, a month ahead may turn out to be impossible even if we learn all the
laws governing our atmosphere. Similarly, changes of parameters describing
the state of an organism undergoing some diseases belong to the class of
chaotic processes. Thus even when knowing perfectly the behavior of the
illness, a patient’s fate may be uncertain. In short, we can say that knowing
the laws governing the world does not guarantee its predictability.
Let us look at those issues in a slightly more general way. Probabilistic
theory teaches us that every deterministic process can be approximated
to arbitrary precision by random processes. This is in essence a corollary
to the large of law numbers and central limit theorem. A book on a table
seems to be motionless. In reality it is being bounced on an enormous
amount of vibrating atoms of the table. Those hits, on a macroscopic
level, give the effect of a hard, unyielding surface.
On the other hand, it has been shown that a wide class of stochastic
processes is a limit of purely deterministic processes. Let us again con-
sider (2) for λ = 4. Let us pick an arbitrary real number x0 ∈ [0, 1],
compute the successive values xn and define a sequence ξn by
ξn =
{
0 for xn ≤ 12
1 for xn > 12 .
Such a sequence ξn is indistinguishable from a sequence obtained by suc-
cessive random trials, for example coin tosses (1 = heads, 0 = tails).
No statistician would be able to tell those sequences apart, and a pure
mathematician could prove that for almost all x0 ∈ [0, 1] such a distinc-
tion is not even possible. More generally, it has been shown (C. W. Kim,
A. Iwanik) that every Markov operator can be approximated in strong
topology by operators coming from deterministic transformations.
Therefore, whether our observations and deliberations drive us to a con-
clusion that the world is governed by deterministic or random laws, it may
be an illusion brought by the finite precision of our instruments.
To finish it off, one more remark from classical dynamical systems
theory. Let us recall that a classical dynamical system (with continuous
time) acting on space X is a family {St} of transformations of X into
itself, indexed with a real parameter t ∈ R, which satisfies the following:
S0(x) = x for x ∈ X, (3)
St1+t2(x) = St2(St1(x)) for x ∈ X, t1, t2 ∈ R. (4)
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This system is of course interpreted as movement in the space X. Every
point is moved in such a way that its position at time t is given by St(x).
For a given x, the function t 7→ St(x) is called the trajectory of x. It
is denoted in short by (St(x)). Condition (3) tells us that at t = 0 the
trajectory comes through point x and (4) that points in X move between
time t1 and t1 + t2 in the same manner as between t = 0 and t2. Thus,
a dynamical system may be interpreted independently from the laws of
time on X.
It is easy to see from (3) and (4) that not all curves in X can be
trajectories. They can only be functions which are constant (St(x) = x for
t ∈ R), periodic (St+T = St for t ∈ R) or injective (St1(x) 6= St2(x) for
t1 6= t2). Let Y be an arbitrary set. The trace of a trajectory (St(x)) on
the set Y is any function f : R→ Y of the form
f(t) = φ(St(x)) for t ∈ R,
where φ is a certain mapping from X to Y. We call φ the projection of X
onto Y.We can now ask a natural question: which functions f : R→ Y can
be traces of some dynamical system? The answer is brief: all of them. More
precisely, for every family of functions fλ : R→ Y indexed by a parameter
λ (λ ∈ Λ) there exists a space X and a dynamical system {St} on X such
that all functions fλ are traces of trajectories of this system with the same
projection φ independent of λ.
The philosophical implication of this theorem is clear. Whatever
strange, undeterministic or plainly incomprehensible phenomena we ob-
serve in our world Y, there may exist another, completely deterministic
world X and what we observe is just a projection of the dynamics of a dif-
ferent world.
Thesis 5. The most important riddle in the world – the essence
of consciousness – is not a mathematical problem. Mathematics
belongs to the sphere of matter, not the sphere of the soul. Reasoning and
proving is an act of the brain, which – like a computer – is built from
material elements, neurons in this case. It is useful to recall here that the
engineers of a new generation of computers are trying to mimic neural
networks. “WE know mind and body,” says Nisargadatta Maharaj. They
are embedded in the material world in which mathematics is the king. Our
consciousness is outside of the material world, which is why I believe it is
unattainable for mathematics.
What is consciousness, I know not. But the certainty of my existence,
my separation from other people is so strong that no reasoning and no
observation can damage it. Let us assume someone proves to me that my
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consciousness does not exist, that I am merely a collection or a construction
of atoms, or that there is no me at all. I will look at him with admiration,
or compassion, depending on the standard of his proof, but it will be ME
looking.
It is strange that only a small number of people feel the riddle of their
own existence. For those who do not feel it, words of Steinhaus, who writes
about his consciousness, may be useful again:
When I accept the multitude of similar beings, then the astonishing
fact that one of them, for some reason, is “me” and it’s only that
one that is hurt by pain or can enjoy a drink, becomes a vast riddle.
Thesis 6. Mathematicians mostly dislike and do not understand
probability. In the survey of most important achievements of modern
mathematics created by the Bourbaki group, there is no mention of proba-
bility theory. Meantime it is this theory that has had the most spectacular
achievements. As far as theory is concerned, it is one of the most advanced
parts of mathematics. As regards applications, it massively outclasses all
the others.
The universality of probabilistic methods is astonishing. The applica-
tions of probability in physics, genetics, demographics, etc. is obvious to
everyone. The applications in “pure” mathematics are less known. However,
probability has become useful in number theory, differential and integral
equations, numerical methods and many other parts of analysis. Thus, the
solutions of some important differential equations are expressible as ex-
plicit mean values of some stochastic processes (Feynman–Kac formula).
Other differential equations can be approximated by difference equations,
which are most easily solved by random methods.
As a curiosity I will mention that the theory of the integral of multi-
valued functions has been developed by probabilists in a much more general
form many years before it was rediscovered by analysts.
It is becoming less of a joke to say that probability theory is one of
the main branches of nature science, and the rest of mathematics is a sup-
porting science.
A question remains whether the development of probability theory is
a reflection of the fact that our world, not even including quantum me-
chanics, is by its nature governed by random laws. I do not know, but
I hope that is not entirely the case.
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